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COMMENT

CRUISES, CLASS ACTIONS, AND THE COURT
David Korn and David Rosenberg*
As the Carnival Triumph debacle splashed across the national
consciousness, 1 lawyers shook their heads. Sensationalist news
coverage exposed common knowledge in the legal community:
cruise passengers have little recourse against carriers, and, as a result,
they often bear the brunt of serious physical and financial injuries.
Cruise lines, escaping legal accountability for their negligence, sail
off undeterred from neglecting passenger safety on future voyages. 2
While its previous decisions helped entrench this problem, a recently
argued case presents the Supreme Court with another opportunity to
address it. 3

The fine print on cruise ship tickets requires that passengers
submit most claims to arbitration and prohibits passengers from
uniting similar claims in a class action or class arbitration. 4 It
might not be apparent why a passenger with a claim worth
thousands of dollars would lack recourse without class action, but
the process of resolving claims individually is biased in favor of
the cruise line, and only class action allows evenhanded

*
David Korn is a 2013 J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School, where David
Rosenberg is the Lee S. Kreindler Professor of Law. They are the authors of David
Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcions’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process:
The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming June 2013). This
Comment applies arguments from that paper to recent developments in the cruise industry
and before the Supreme Court.
1.
See, e.g., Curt Anderson, Cruise Lawsuits Are in, but Carnival Has Advantage,
ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 21, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/crui
se-lawsuits-are-carnival-has-advantage.
2.
See generally Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger’s Dilemma: TwentyFirst Century Ships, Nineteenth-Century Rights, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 447 (2004).
3.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12–133 (argued Feb. 27, 2013).
4.
See Ticket Contract , CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, http://www.carnival.com/CMS/Static_
Templates/ticket_contract.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
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justice. 5 The bias arises because, in any individual case involving
questions common to a group of plaintiffs, the cruise line will
greatly outspend any individual claimant, not just because of its
greater wealth, but because it has a greater stake in the litigation
classwide. 6
Suppose the 4000 Triumph passengers each suffered $1000 in
damages, which they believe was caused by the cruise line’s
negligence. Proceeding separately, each passenger would spend
no more than $1000 to prove the defendant’s negligence, but the
defendant, concerned about its total liability, would spend up to
$400,000. The parties will get what they pay for, and the
defendant’s first-class defense likely will prevail over each
passenger’s cut-rate case. Realizing their disadvantage, rational
plaintiffs may decide not to file otherwise worthy individual
claims.
Class action eliminates this disparity in economic power. By
aggregating all claims, plaintiffs gain the same incentive to make
a first-class case that the defendant naturally possesses. This does
not apply just for cruises, because class action evens the playing
field for a broad spectrum of claims that affect our lives:
employment discrimination, environmental harm, securities and
consumer fraud, anti-competitive conduct, constitutional
violations, and mass torts. 7
The fate of the Carnival Triumph passengers may have been
sealed by a Supreme Court ruling from 2011. In AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,8 the Court upheld clauses in arbitration agreements
that banned class procedures despite state law findings that such
contracts were unconscionable. 9 While Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion questioned the cost and formality of class arbitration, 10
none of the justices addressed the pro-defendant bias that exists
without a class solution.

5.
See David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcions’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the
Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming

June 2013).
6.
See id.
7.
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
(forthcoming June 2013).
8.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9.
See id. at 1744, 1748.
10. See id. at 1751–52.
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The Court has a chance to change course when it
decides American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 11 a case
that concerns millions of claims brought by small retailers who
allege that the credit card company violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act by abusing monopoly power. 12 Below, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement that barred class actions because high costs would
render
any
individual
plaintiff’s
claim
economically
13
impractical. An essential expert analysis would cost at least
$300,000, but even the highest-volume retailer would only expect
to recover damages of $12,850.14 To avoid this hopeless situation,
the plaintiffs ask the Supreme Court to refuse to require
individual arbitration that does not allow the effective vindication
of legal rights. 15
The danger is that the Court may go only halfway, striking
down some aspects of the American Express agreement without
requiring a form of class action. Half-measures, such as allowing
plaintiffs to voluntarily join their claims or requiring that a
defendant pay the fees and costs of a prevailing plaintiff, leave in
place pro-defendant bias. Voluntary joinder of millions of claims
is an impractical substitute for class action aggregation, and
shifting a plaintiff’s fees and costs does not change the parties’
disproportionate stakes. Even if American Express footed the
$300,000 bill for the plaintiffs’ expert analysis, it could still
overwhelm a minimally competent case by spending many
millions more on its own analysis.
Instead, the Court should embrace a more robust “effective
vindication” rule, allowing states to limit the enforcement of
arbitration agreements that compromise claimants’ substantive
rights. American Express allows the Supreme Court to finally
acknowledge a bias that endangers the enforcement of laws upon
which we depend.

11. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
granted by Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (argued Feb. 27,

2013).
12. See id. at 207–08.
13. See id. at 218.
14. Id. at 217–18.
15. Brief for Respondents at 46–47, Am, Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12–133
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2013), 2013 WL 267025.

2012

Cruises, Class Actions, and the Court

99

If the Court does not address this bias, it may be up to
Congress to legislate class methods that allow the effective
enforcement of its laws. Ideally, Congress would amend the
Federal Arbitration Act 16 to limit the effects of the Supreme
Court’s class arbitration rulings. But Congress could start with
smaller steps, requiring the availability of class procedures for
rights protected in new legislation. Amid continuing Carnival
incidents, New York Senator Chuck Schumer proposed a
“passenger’s bill of rights” that would expand substantive
protections for cruise consumers that would strengthen medical
care and refund requirements. 17 Though perhaps a less telegenic
proposal, Congress should supplement any cruise reforms by
specifically permitting either class action or class arbitration
options for those bringing passenger claims. Until the Court or
Congress addresses this overlooked pro-defendant bias, cruise
carriers, credit card companies, and many others who inflict
classwide injuries will avoid full responsibility for their actions.

16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
17. Press Release, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Calls for Cruise Ship
“Bill of Rights” (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=34
1068.

